Page:Works of Plato his first fifty-five dialogues (Taylor 1804) (Vol 3 of 5) (IA Vol3worksofplato00plat).pdf/14

 6 INTRODUCTION TO

not in the least contradicting Socrates, but completing the contemplation which he had begun, unfolds the entire doctrine of ideas, introducing for this purpose four questions concerning them: whether they have a subsistence ; of what things there are ideas, and of what not; what kind of beings they are, and what power they possess : and how they are participated by subordinate natures. And this being discussed, Parmenides ascends from hence to the one which subsists above intelligibles and ideas, and adduces nine hypotheses concerning it; five, supposing the one to have a subsistence, arid four, supposing it not to subsist; accurately investigating, at the fame time, the consequences resulting from these hypotheses. But of this more here-after. With respect to ideas, though many invincible arguments may be adduced for their existence, the following appear to me remarkable for their perspicuity and strength. Diversity of powers always indicates diversitv of objects. But it is obvious to every one, that the power of intellect is different from the power of sense; that which is sensible, therefore, is one thing, and that which is intelligible another. And as intellect is superior to sense, so is intelligible more excellent than that which is sensible. But that which is sensible has an existence; and by a much greater reason, therefore, that which is intelligible must have a real subsistence. But intelligible is a certain universal species ; for universal reason is always the object of intelligence. And hence there are such things as intelligible and common species of things which we call ideas. Again, all corporeal natures subsist in time; but whatever subsists in time is measured by time; and whatever is thus conditioned depends on time for the perfection of its being. But time is composed of the past, present, and future. And if we conceive that any one of these periods is taken away from the nature with which it is connected, that nature must immediately perish. Time, therefore, is so essentially and intimately united with the natures which it measures, that their being, such as it is, depends on the existence of time. But time, as is evident, is perpetually flowing, and this in the most rapid manner imagination can conceive. It is evident, there- fore, that the natures to which it is so essential must subsist in a manner equally transitory and flowing. As we cannot, therefore, affirm with propriety, of any part of time that it is, since even before we can form the assertion the