Page:Works of Plato his first fifty-five dialogues (Taylor 1804) (Vol 2 of 5) (IA Vol2worksofplato00plat).pdf/466

 45 6

INTRODUCTION TO THE TIM JE US.'

to the privation of a uniform reaſon, which comprehends all the reafons of beings in itfelf, is the paradigm of the matter of bodies; which, fays Por¬ phyry, both Plato and the Pythagoreans call a quantum, not after the fame manner as form is a quantum, but according to privation and analyfis, extenlion and divulfion, and its mutation from being.

Matter, therefore, accord¬

ing to this do&rine, as Simplicius well obferves, is nothing elfe than the permutation and viciffitude of fenfibJe forms, with refpefl to in tell igibles ; lince from thence they verge downwards, and extend to perfect non-entity, or the laft of things—that is, to matter itfelf. Hence, fays he, becaufe dregs and matter are always the laft of things, the Egyptians aftert that matter, which they enigmatically denominate water, is the dregs of the fiift life; fublifting as a certain mire or mud, the receptacle of generable and fenfible natures ; and which is not any definite form, but a certain conftitution of fubfiftence, in the fame manner as that which is indivifible, immaterial and true being, is a conftitution of an intelligible nature.

And though all forms

fubfift both in in tel ligibles and in matter, yet in the former they fubfift without matter, indivifibly and truly ; but in the latter diviiibly, and after the manner of fhadows.

And on this account every fenfible form is diffi-

pated through its union with material interval, and falls from the liability and reality of being. But the following profound and admirable defcription of matter by Plo¬ tinus (Ennead. 3, lib. 6) will, I doubt not, be gratefully received by the Platonic reader.—“ Since matter (fays he) is neither foul, nor intelleft, nor life, nor form, nor reafon, nor bound, but a certain indefinitenefs; nor yet capacity, for what can it produce ? fince it is foreign from all thefe, it cannot merit .the appellation of being ; but is defervedly called non-entity.

Nor yet

is it non-entity in the fame manner as motion and permanency are non-beings, considered as different from being: but it is true non-entity; the mere Shadow and imagination of bulk, and the deiire of fubfiftence ; remaining fixed without abiding, of itfelf invisible, and avoiding the defire of him whois anxious to perceive its nature.

Hence, when no one perceives it, it is

then in a manner prefent; but cannot be viewed by him who ftrives intently to behold it.

Again, in itfelf contraries always appear ; the Small and the

great, the lefs and the more, deficience and excels.

So that it is a phantom,

neither abiding nor yet able to fly away; capable of no one denomination, and