Page:Works of Plato his first fifty-five dialogues (Taylor 1804) (Vol 2 of 5) (IA Vol2worksofplato00plat).pdf/427

 theological; imitating by this mean Nature which it contemplates. Further ſtill, ſince according to the Pythagoric doctrine things receive a triple diviſion, into ſuch as are intelligible, ſuch as are phyſical, and ſuch as rank in the middle of theſe, which the Pythagoreans uſually call mathematical, all theſe may very conveniently be viewed in all. For in intelligibles things middle and laſt ſubſiſt in a cauſal manner; and in mathematical natures both are contained, ſuch as are firſt according to ſimilitude, and ſuch as are third after the manner of an exemplar. And laſtly, in natural things the reſemblances of ſuch as are prior ſubſiſt. With great propriety, therefore, does Timæus, when deſcribing the compoſition of the ſoul, exhibit her powers, and reaſons, and the elements of her nature, through mathematical names: but Plato defines the characteriſtics of theſe from geometrical figures, and at the ſame time leaves the cauſes of all theſe pre-ſubſiſting in a primary manner in the intelligible intellect, and the intellect of the artificer of the univerſe.

And thus much for the manner of the dialogue; but its argument or hypotheſis is as follows. Socrates coming into the Piræus for the ſake of the Bendidian feſtival, which was ſacred to Diana, and was celebrated prior to the Panathenaia, on the twentieth of the month Thargelion or June, diſcourſed there concerning a republic with Polemarchus, Cephalus, Glauco, Adimantus, and Thraſymachus the ſophiſt. But on the following day he related this diſcourſe in the city to Timæus, Critias, Hermocrates, and a fourth nameleſs perſon. On the third day they end the narration; and Timæus commences from hence his diſcourſe on the univerſe, before Socrates, Critias, and Hermocrates; the ſame nameleſs perſon who was preſent at the ſecond narration being now abſent from the third.

With reſpect to the term 'nature', which is differently defined by different philoſophers, it is neceſſary to inform the reader, that Plato does not conſider either matter or material form, or body, or natural powers, as worthy to be called nature; though nature has been thus denominated by others. Nor does he think proper to call it ſoul; but eſtabliſhing its eſſence between ſoul and corporeal powers, he conſiders it as inferior to the former through its being divided about bodies, and its incapacity of converſion to itſelf, but as ſurpaſſing the latter through its containing the reaſons of all