Page:Works of John C. Calhoun, v1.djvu/413

 population engaged in agricultural or other rural pursuits. If this should not be sufficient, in itself, to establish an equilibrium — a maximum of representation might be established, beyond which the number allotted to each election district or city should never extend.

Other means of a similar character might be adopted, by which, the different and strongly marked interests of the States — especially those resulting from geographical features, or the diversity of pursuits, might be prevented from coming into conflict, and the one secured against the control of the other. By these, and other contrivances suited to the peculiar condition of a State, its government might be made to assume the character of that of a concurrent majority, and have all the tranquillity and stability belonging to such a form of government; and thereby avoid the disorder and anarchy in which the government of the numerical majority must ever end. While the government of the United States continues, it will, indeed, require a much less perfect government on the part of a State, to protect it from the evils to which an imperfectly organized government would expose it, than if it formed a separate and independent community. The reason is, that the States, as members of a Union, bound to defend each other against all external dangers and domestic violence, are relieved from the necessity of collecting and disbursing large amounts of revenue, which otherwise would be required; and are, thereby, relieved from that increased tendency to conflict and disorder which ever accompanies