Page:Works of John C. Calhoun, v1.djvu/395

 prove successful, and the system end in disunion, is, to say the least, highly probable. But if it should fail, the great increase of power and patronage which must, in consequence, accrue to the government of the United States, would but render certain, and hasten the termination in the other alternative. So that, at all events, to the one, or to the other — to monarchy, or disunion it must come, if not prevented by strenuous and timely efforts. And this brings up the question — How is it to be prevented? How can these sad alternatives be averted?

For this purpose, it is indispensable that the government of the United States should be restored to its federal character. Nothing short of a perfect restoration, as it came from the hands of its framers, can avert them. It is folly to suppose that any popular government, except one strictly federal, in practice, as well as in theory, can last, over a country of such vast extent and diversity of interests and institutions. It would not be more irrational to suppose, that it could last, without the responsibility of the rulers to the ruled. The tendency of the former to oppress the latter, is not stronger than is the tendency of the more powerful section, to oppress the weaker. Nor is the right of suffrage more indispensable to enforce the responsibility of the rulers to the ruled, than a federal organization, to compel the parts to respect the rights of each other. It requires the united action of both to prevent the abuse of power and oppression; and to constitute, really and truly, a constitutional government.