Page:Works of John C. Calhoun, v1.djvu/333

 of the separate governments of the several States, to the same extent, cease to stand, under these provisions, in the relation of coequal and co-ordinate departments with the federal judiciary. Nor does the effect stop here. Their other departments, the legislative and executive — to the same extent, through their respective State judiciaries, no longer continue to stand in the relation of coequals and co-ordinates with the corresponding departments of the federal government. The reason is obvious. As the laws and the acts of the government and its departments, can, if opposed, reach the people individually only through the courts — to whatever extent the judiciary of the United States is made paramount to that of the individual States, to the same extent will the legislative and executive departments of the federal government — and, thus, the entire government itself, be made paramount to the legislative and executive departments — and the entire governments of the individual States. It results, of course, that if the right of appeal from the State courts to those of the United States, should be extended as far as the government of the United States may claim that its powers and authority extend, the government of the several States would cease, in effect, to be its coequals and co-ordinates; and become, in fact, dependent upon, and subordinate to it. Such being the case, the important question presents itself for consideration — does the constitution vest Congress with the power to pass an act authorizing such appeals?

It is certain, that no such power is expressly