Page:Works of John C. Calhoun, v1.djvu/160

 Among the first, is that which springs from the idea of divided sovereignty; involving the perplexing question — how the people of the several States can be partly sovereign, and partly, not sovereign — sovereign as to the reserved — and not sovereign, as to the delegated powers? There is no difficulty in understanding how powers, appertaining to sovereignty, may be divided; and the exercise of one portion delegated to one set of agents, and another portion to another: or how sovereignty may be vested in one man, or in a few, or in many. But how sovereignty itself — the supreme power — can be divided — how the people of the several States can be partly sovereign, and partly not sovereign — partly supreme, and partly not supreme, it is impossible to conceive. Sovereignty is an entire thing — to divide, is — to destroy it.

But suppose this difficulty surmounted — another not less perplexing remains. If sovereignty be surrendered and transferred, in part or entirely, by the several States, it must be transferred to somebody; and the question is, to whom? Not, certainly, to the government — as has been thoughtlessly asserted by some; for that would subvert the fundamental principle of our system — that sovereignty resides in the people. But if not to the government, it must be transferred — if at all — to the people, regarded in the aggregate, as a nation. But this is opposed, not only by a force of reason which cannot be resisted, but by the preamble and tenth amended article of the constitution, as has just been shown. If then it be transferred neither to the one