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334 by the following decisions of the courts of last resort of other States. Sandage v. Studebaker, 142 Ind. 148; Hankey v. Downey, 116 Ind. 118; New v. Walker, 108 Md. 370; Union National Bank v. Brown (Ky.), 41 S.W. 273; Mason v. McLeod, 57 Kan. 105; Pinney v. ''First Nat. Bank'' (Kan.), 75 Pac. 119; Tod v. Wick, 36 Ohio St. 370; Haskell v. Jones, 86 Pa. 173; Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501.

The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in passing upon a similar statute, said: "The right to prescribe regulations for the protection of its citizens against fraud and imposition is not taken from the State by the Federal Constitution or by any National statute. On the contrary, it may be considered as having been authoritatively settled that the National government cannot exercise police powers for the protection of the inhabitants of a State. These are local matters, and must be governed and regulated by the State." Union National Bank v. Brown, supra.

In New v. Walker, supra, the Supreme Court of Indiana said concerning a statute on this subject: "As the Federal Legislature cannot enact police regulations which will yield the citizen of the State just protection, it must be that the State Legislature may enact such regulations, or the citizens be left without protection. We are unwilling to declare that vendees of patent rights cannot be restrained by reasonable police regulations, and we do therefore declare that the provisions of the statute under immediate mention, being in the nature of police regulations, are constitutional and valid."

The contrary view is expressed, with more or less directness, in the following cases in State courts: Hollida v. Hunt, 70 Ill. 109; Cranson v. Smith, 37 Mich. 309; Welch v. Phelps, 14 Neb. 134; Crittenden v. White, 23 Minn. 24; and in the following Federal cases: Ex parte Robinson, 2 Bis. 309; Woollen v. Banker, 2 Flip. 33; Castle v. Mitchinson, 25 Fed. 394; Reeves v. Corning, 51 Fed. 774; and Pegram v. American A. Co., 122 Fed. 1000.

We have no hesitancy in reaching the conclusion that those cases are best supnorted by reason which hold to the doctrine that such statutes as that now under consideration do not amount to an interference with or impairment of the rights conferred by the patent issued by the Federal Government, nor to an