Page:Wood v. Raffensperger (20-14418) (2020) Decision.pdf/19

 Nor does any exception to mootness apply. True, we often review otherwise-moot election appeals because they are “capable of repetition yet evading review.” ACLU v. The Fla. Bar, 999 F.2d 1486, 1496 (11th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). We may apply this exception when “(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.” ''Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 860 F.2d 1022, 1023 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford'', 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975)). But we will not apply this exception if there is “some alternative vehicle through which a particular policy may effectively be subject to” complete review. Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1308 (11th Cir. 2004).

The “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception does not save Wood’s appeal because there is no “reasonable expectation” that Wood will again face the issues in this appeal. Based on the posture of this appeal, the challenged action is the denial of an emergency injunction against the certification of election results. See Fleming, 785 F.3d at 446 (explaining that whether the issues in an interlocutory appeal are “capable of repetition, yet evading review” is a separate question from whether the issues in the overall lawsuit are capable of doing so). That denial is the decision we would review but for the jurisdictional problems. But Wood cannot satisfy the requirement that there be a “reasonable expectation”