Page:Wood v. Raffensperger (20-14418) (2020) Decision.pdf/13

 favored over in-person voters, that harm does not affect Wood as an individual—it is instead shared identically by the four million or so Georgians who voted in person this November. “[W]hen the asserted harm is… shared in substantially equal measure by… a large class of citizens,” it is not a particularized injury. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). And irregularities in the tabulation of election results do not affect Wood differently from any other person. His allegation, at bottom, remains “that the law… has not been followed.” ''Dillard v. Chilton Cnty. Comm’n, 495 F.3d 1324, 1332 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Lance v. Coffman'', 549 U.S. 437, 442 (2007)).

Wood’s attempts to liken his injury to those we have found sufficient in other appeals fall short. In Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, we ruled that “[r]equiring a registered voter either to produce photo identification to vote in person or to cast an absentee or provisional ballot is an injury sufficient for standing.” 554 F.3d 1340, 1351–52 (11th Cir. 2009). But the injury there was the burden of producing photo identification, not the existence of separate rules for in-person and absentee voters. Id. And the burden to produce photo identification affected each voter in a personal way. For example, some plaintiffs in Common Cause alleged that they “would be required to make a special trip” to obtain valid identification “that is not required of voters who have driver’s licenses or passports.” Id. at 1351 (internal quotation marks omitted). By contrast, even Wood