Page:Wood v. Raffensperger (20-14418) (2020) Decision.pdf/10

 Standing is a threshold jurisdictional inquiry: the elements of standing are “an indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). To prove standing, Wood “must prove (1) an injury in fact that (2) is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and (3) is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Jacobson v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 974 F.3d 1236, 1245 (11th Cir. 2020). If he cannot satisfy these requirements, then we may not decide the merits of his appeal. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94.

Wood lacks standing because he fails to allege the “first and foremost of standing’s three elements”: an injury in fact. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). An injury in fact is “an invasion of a legally protected interest that is both concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Trichell v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 964 F.3d 990, 996 (11th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). Wood’s injury is not particularized.

Wood asserts only a generalized grievance. A particularized injury is one that “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (internal quotation marks omitted). For example, if Wood were a political candidate harmed by the recount, he would satisfy this requirement because he could assert a personal, distinct injury. Cf. ''Roe v. Alabama ex rel. Evans'', 43 F.3d