Page:Wood v. Raffensperger (1 20-cv-04651-SDG) (2020) Opinion and Order.pdf/33

 (2) whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.” Richardson v. Texas Sec’y of State, 978 F.3d 220, 229 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)). The party invoking the Due Process Clause’s procedural protections bears the “burden… of establishing a cognizable liberty or property interest.” Richardson, 978 F.3d at 229 (citing Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005)). Wood bases his procedural due process claim on “a vested interest in being present and having meaningful access to observe and monitor the electoral process.” But Wood does not articulate how this “vested interest” fits within a recognized, cognizable interest protected by procedural due process. The Court is not persuaded that the right to monitor an audit or vote recount is a liberty or property right secured by the Constitution. For example, the Eleventh Circuit does “assume that the right to vote is a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.” Jones v. Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016, 1048 (11th Cir. 2020). But the circuit court has expressly declined to extend the strictures of procedural due process to “a State’s election procedures.” New Ga. Project v. Raffensperger, 976 F.3d 1278, 1282 (11th Cir. 2020) (“The generalized due process argument that the plaintiffs argued for and the