Page:Wittgenstein - Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 1922.djvu/45

Rh its elements with which the picture touches reality.

In order to be a picture a fact must have something in common with what it pictures.

In the picture and the pictured there must be something identical in order that the one can be a picture of the other at all.

What the picture must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it after its manner—rightly or falsely—is its form of representation.

The picture can represent every reality whose form it has.

The spatial picture, everything spatial, the coloured, everything coloured, etc.

The picture, however, cannot represent its form of representation; it shows it forth.

The picture represents its object from without (its standpoint is its form of representation), therefore the picture represents its object rightly or falsely.

But the picture cannot place itself outside of its form of representation.

What every picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it at all—rightly or falsely—is the logical form, that is, the form of reality.

If the form of representation is the logical form, then the picture is called a logical picture.

Every picture is also a logical picture. (On the other hand, for example, not every picture is spatial.)

The logical picture can depict the world.

The picture has the logical form of representation in common with what it pictures.

The picture depicts reality by representing a possibility of the existence and non-existence of atomic facts. Rh