Page:Wittgenstein - Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 1922.djvu/147

Rh  of the wrong kind, and therefore it survives the wrong arguments no better and no worse than the senseless hypothesis attached for this purpose.)

Similarly it was proposed to express "There are no things" by "$$~ (\exists x).x=x$$" But even if this were a proposition—would it not be true if indeed "There were things", but these were not identical with themselves?

In the general propositional form, propositions occur in a proposition only as bases of the truth-operations.

At first sight it appears as if there were also a different way in which one proposition could occur in another.

Especially in certain propositional forms of psychology, like "A thinks, that $$p$$ is the case", or "A thinks $$p$$", etc.

Here it appears superficially as if the proposition $$p$$ stood to the object A in a kind of relation.

(And in modern epistemology (Russell, Moore, etc.) those propositions have been conceived in this way.)

But it is clear that "A believes that $$p$$", "A thinks $$p$$", "A says $$p$$", are of the form "'$$p$$' says $$p$$": and here we have no co-ordination of a fact and an object, but a co-ordination of facts by means of a co-ordination of their objects.

This shows that there is no such thing as the soul—the subject, etc.—as it is conceived in contemporary superficial psychology.

A composite soul would not be a soul any longer.

The correct explanation of the form of the proposition "$$p$$A judges $$p$$" must show that it is impossible to judge a nonsense. (Russell's theory does not satisfy this condition.)

To perceive a complex means to perceive that Rh