Page:Wittgenstein - Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 1922.djvu/113

Rh (The fact that we can infer fa from (x)fx shows that generality is present also in the symbol "(x).fx".

If p follows from q, I can conclude from qp to p; infer p from q.

The method of inference is to be understood from the two propositions alone.

Only they themselves can justify the inference.

Laws of inference, which—as in Frege and Russell—are to justify the conclusions, are senseless and would be superfluous.

All inference takes place a priori.

From an elementary proposition no other can be inferred.

In no way can an inference be made from the existence of one state of affairs to the existence of another entirely different from it.

There is no causal nexus which justifies such an inference.

The events of the future cannot be inferred from those of the present.

Superstition is the belief in the causal nexus. The freedom of the will consists in the fact that future actions cannot be known now. We could only know them if causality were an inner necessity, like that of logical deduction.—The connexion of knowledge and what is known is that of logical necessity.

("A knows that p is the case*' is senseless if p is a tautology.)

If from the fact that a proposition is obvious to us it does not follow that it is true, then obviousness is no justification for our belief in its truth.

If a proposition follows from another, then the latter says more than the former, the former less than the latter. Rh