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 industries being owned by the Government, and most of the remaining 10 per cent consisting of workers' co-operatives. And secondly, there is no way to store up accumulated wealth in substantial amounts—it cannot be invested in stocks and bonds, for there is none of either; nor in land, buildings, and industries, for these are not on sale; nor in money, for this has already depreciated 15,000 times and is constantly falling faster. How, then, can there be a capitalist class—with no means to "earn" its wealth and no way to keep it after it gets it? The whole thing is impossible. That many crafty individuals have been able to take advantage of the social upheaval by speculating and stealing and have amassed a store of gold, jewels, and other valuables, is undeniable. But to dignify them with the name of the new bourgeoisie is ridiculous. There is no real capitalist class in Russia now, nor is there liable to be one there in the future.

So far, the new economic program has been successful in accomplishing the things expected of it. The blockade is being broken; international trade is developindeveloping [sic]; streams of machinery and manufactured products are flowing to Russia’s impoverished industries and people—in the six weeks just preceding my departure from Russia 58 ships, loaded with vital necessities, arrived in Petrograd from abroad. Several concessions of timber and other raw material supplies have already been leased out, and many more are under negotiation. Small-scale industries are springing up all over the country and sending a fresh flood of products into the needy market. But most important of all is the effect produced upon the peasants. Unquestionably they have been tremendously stimulated by the substitution of the grain tax for the grain levy. This Spring they put in an exceptionally large acreage of crops, and worked diligently to produce a harvest which, to begin with, promised to be large enough to solve half of Russia's tremendous difficulties. But the drought came on and ruined it. This has dealt a deadly blow to the success of the new program. It means that the food shortage must continue for an indefinite time, and with it the inseparably connected industrial crisis. It is a great calamity. Had there but been a good crop this year the backbone of the industrial problem would have