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 on the board to arbitrate the demands of the conductors and trainmen on the eastern railroads. Clark was formerly Grand Senior Conductor of the Order of Railroad Conductors, but now he is a railroad corporation lawyer. The railroad union leaders believe Clark is their "friend," but the railroad company officials know he is in their service.

A favorable outcome of this arbitration is already assured for the companies. And so it is always. This certainty of controlling the "odd" men, whether selected by agreement with conservative union leaders or appointed by the government, makes the employers ardent advocates of arbitration, voluntary and compulsory.

Employers usually offer arbitration to strong unions in key and basic industries, and refuse it to unions which they believe they can defeat in strikes. An offer of arbitration from the employers is always an evidence of the strength of the union involved.

Employers are anxious to establish arbitration in such industries as coal mining, railroads, etc, especially when the workers have secured good unions. Such strategically placed unions are capable of delivering heavy blows. These the employers are keen to ward off by arbitration. It is in such situations that the "odd" men on the arbitration boards are most reliably active in protecting the interests of the employers, which they conveniently identify with the interests of society as a whole.

The right wing trade union leaders commonly support the employers' policy of foisting arbitration upon the workers. They accept it as a vital part of their general class collaboration program. But the experience of the American labor movement with arbitration has been so bad and there is such a widespread opposition to it among the workers that these leaders are careful about too openly endorsing it.