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2 litigation” that procedural rules often “seek to promote.” Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 435.

(b) None of the three decisions of this Court on which the Government relies—Block, 461 U. S. 273, United States v. Mottaz, 476 U. S. 834, and United States v. Beggerly, 524 U. S. 38—definitively interpreted §2409a(g) as jurisdictional. This Court has made clear that it will not undo a “definitive earlier interpretation” of a statutory provision as jurisdictional without due regard for the principles of stare decisis. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U. S. 130, 138. Yet the mere fact that this Court previously described something as jurisdictional is not dispositive, as “[c]ourts, including this Court, have more than occasionally misused the term ‘jurisdictional’ to refer to nonjurisdictional prescriptions.” Fort Bend, 587 U. S., at ___–___, n. 4. To separate “definitive” interpretations of jurisdiction from those in which the term “jurisdictional” has been used imprecisely, the Court asks if a prior decision addressed whether a provision is “ ‘technically jurisdictional,’ ” i.e., whether it truly operates as a limit on a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, and whether anything in the decision “turn[ed] on that characterization.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 512 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 91). A decision that simply states that “the court is