Page:Wilkins v. United States (2023).pdf/14

Rh analysis of whether the text and context were consistent with equitable tolling would have been wasted words if the Court had already held that §2409a(g) was jurisdictional. Precisely because the Court’s inquiry was so focused on the particular nature of equitable tolling, Beggerly also did not address whether other exceptions such as “fraudulent concealment or equitable estoppel might apply,” as Justice Stevens noted in his concurrence. Id., at 49. If anything, Beggerly’s discussion of nonjurisdictional reasons why tolling specifically was unavailable indicates the Court understood §2409a(g) not to be jurisdictional. Thus, Beggerly undermines any notion that Block and Mottaz had put the jurisdictional question to rest.

All three cases therefore point in one direction: This Court has never definitively interpreted §2409a(g) as jurisdictional. For similar reasons, the Government’s argument about legislative acquiescence is unavailing. Congress amended the Act in 1986 to provide special rules for States in the wake of Block. See 100 Stat. 3351–3352. Then, as now, “none of our decisions establishe[d]” that the time limit was jurisdictional, so there was no definitive judicial interpretation to which Congress could acquiesce. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 291 (2001). The mere existence of a decision employing the term jurisdiction without elaboration does not show Congress adopted that view. Nor can the Government’s handful of lower court opinions stand in for a ruling of this Court, especially where some of these decisions contain only fleeting references to jurisdiction. See Boechler, 596 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 7–8).