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xvii be expected to have, in fact, upon mankind, yet one may appeal even to interest and self-love, and ask, since from man's nature, condition, and the shortness of life, so little, so very little, indeed, can possibly in any case be gained by vice, whether it be so prodigious a thing to sacrifice that little to the most intimate of all obligations; and which a man cannot transgress without being self-condemned, and, unless he has corrupted his nature, without real self-dislike? This question, I say, may be asked, even upon suspicion that the prospect of a future life were ever so uncertain.

The observation that man is thus, by his very nature, a law to himself, pursued to its just consequences, is of the utmost importance; because from it will follow, that though men should, through stupidity, or speculative scepticism, be ignorant of, or disbelieve, any authority in the universe to punish the violation of this law; yet, if there should be such authority, they would be as really liable to punishment, as though they had been beforehand convinced that such punishment would follow. For, in whatever sense we understand justice, even supposing, what I think would be very presumptuous to assert, that the end of divine punishment is no other than that of civil punishment—namely, to prevent further mischief; upon this bold supposition, ignorance or disbelief of the sanction would by no means exempt even from this injustice; because it is not foreknowledge of the punishment which renders obnoxious to it, but merely violating a known obligation.

And here it comes in one's way to take notice of a manifest error, or mistake, in the author now cited, unless, perhaps, he has incautiously expressed himself so as to be misunderstood—namely, that "it is malice only, and not goodness, which can make us afraid." Whereas, in reality, goodness is the natural and just object of the greatest fear to an ill man. Malice may be appeased or satiated; humour may change; but goodness is a fixed, steady, immovable principle of action. If either of the former holds the sword of justice, there is plainly ground for the greatest of crimes to hope for impunity; but if it be goodness, there can be no possible hope, whilst the reason of things, or the ends of government, call for punishment. Thus, every one sees how much greater chance of impunity an ill man has, in a partial administration, than in a just and upright one. It