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6 Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Reservation, 594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (, dissenting) (slip op., at 14) (“illustrative examples can help orient affected parties and courts to Congress’s thinking”). It is unsurprising that Texas repeated itself to make its point “doubly sure.” Barton v. Barr, 590 U. S. __, __ (2020) (slip op., at 16). And, in all events, “[r]edundancy in one portion of a statute is not a license to rewrite or eviscerate another portion of the statute contrary to its text.” Ibid.

Second, even when there is an appropriate defendant to sue, a plaintiff may bring an action under Ex parte Young only when the defendant “threaten[s] and [is] about to commence proceedings.” 209 U. S., at 156. Our later cases explain that “the prospect of state suit must be imminent.” Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S. 374, 382 (1992). Here, none of the licensing officials has threatened enforcement proceedings against petitioners because none has authority to bring them. Petitioners do not and cannot dispute this point.

Rather, petitioners complain of the “chill” S. B. 8 has on the purported right to abortion. But as our cases make clear, it is not enough that petitioners “feel inhibited” because S. B. 8 is “on the books.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 42 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nor is a “vague allegation” of potential enforcement permissible. Boise Artesian, 213 U. S., at 285. To sustain suit against the licensing officials, whether under Article III or Ex parte Young, petitioners must show at least a credible and specific threat of enforcement to rescind their medical licenses or assess some other penalty under S. B. 8. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U. S. 149, 159 (2014). Petitioners offer nothing to make this showing. Even if the