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12 also name as defendants Stephen Carlton, Katherine Thomas, Allison Benz, and Cecile Young. On the briefing and argument before us, it appears that these particular defendants fall within the scope of Ex parte Young’s historic exception to state sovereign immunity. Each of these individuals is an executive licensing official who may or must take enforcement actions against the petitioners if they violate the terms of Texas’s Health and Safety Code, including S. B. 8. See, e.g., Tex. Occ. Code Ann. §164.055(a); Brief for Petitioners 33–34. Accordingly, we hold that sovereign immunity does not bar the petitioners’ suit against these named defendants at the motion to dismiss stage.

alone reaches a different conclusion. He emphasizes that suits seeking equitable relief against executive officials are permissible only when supported by tradition. See post, at 2–3 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). He further emphasizes that the relevant tradition here, embodied in Ex parte Young, permits equitable relief against only those officials who possess authority to enforce a challenged state law. Post, at 3–4. We agree with all of these principles; our disagreement is restricted to their application.

suggests that the licensing-official defendants lack authority to enforce S. B. 8 because that statute says it is to be “exclusively” enforced through private civil actions “[n]otwithstanding … any other law.” See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §171.207(a). But the same provision of S. B. 8 also states that the law “may not be construed to … limit the enforceability of any other laws that regulate or prohibit abortion.” §171.207(b)(3). This saving clause is significant because, as best we can tell from the briefing before us, the licensing-official defendants are