Page:Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson.pdf/16

Rh large,” ibid., or purport to enjoin challenged “laws themselves,” Whole Woman’s Health, 594 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 1) (citing California v. Texas, 593 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 8)).

Our colleagues offer no persuasive reply to this problem. does not address it. Meanwhile, offers a radical answer, suggesting once more that this Court should cast aside its precedents requiring federal courts to abide by traditional equitable principles. Post, at 9, n. 3. This time, however, does not claim to identify any countervailing authority to support her proposal. Instead, she says, it is justified purely by the fact that the State of Texas in S. B. 8 has “delegat[ed] its enforcement authority to the world at large.” Ibid. But somewhat analogous complaints could be levied against private attorneys general acts, statutes allowing for private rights of action, tort law, federal antitrust law, and even the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In some sense all of these laws “delegate” the enforcement of public policy to private parties and reward those who bring suits with “bount[ies]” like exemplary or statutory damages and attorney’s fees. Nor does explain where her novel plan to overthrow this Court’s precedents and expand the equitable powers of federal courts would stop—or on what theory it might plausibly happen to reach just this case or maybe those exactly like it.

While this Court’s precedents foreclose some of the petitioners’ claims for relief, others survive. The petitioners