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 constituent unit and another. Thus, whereas in the British India sphere of the proposed Federation, the whole field of legislative activity was mapped out by the Act between the Federal Legislature in British India and the Provinces of British India, and residual powers in the British India sphere of the proposed Federal Legislature were to vest either in the Federal Legislature or the Provincial Legislature at the discretion of the Governor-General, in the case of the States, federal powers alone were enumerated and the residuary powers remained with the States. Even so, the States were not required to accede on all matters specified in the Federal List; their acceptance of the various entries in this list could be made subject to such limitations as might be specified in the Instruments of Accession. Unlike the Provinces they were also to have concurrent jurisdiction in respect of matters specified in the Federal List, subject to the over-riding power of the Federal Legislature.

51. In the executive field too, the authority of the Federation, in its application to the States, was to be correspondingly circumscribed. The executive authority of the Federation was further sought to be limited by reservation of executive powers by the Rulers in their Instruments of Accession for which authority was found in Section 8(1)(c)(ii) of the Act. This implied the introduction into the Act of a theory of division of powers in the federal sphere itself. This was an arrangement patently anti-federal in the sense that it was utterly contrary to the principle of division of powers, legislative, executive and judicial found in every other federal constitution.

52. In the fiscal field also, there was no uniformity as between the States and the Provinces. The States were required to accede on very limited number of items such as customs and excise duties, corporation and salt taxes. Even in this field, there was a concession to the demand made by the States that they should contribute to the federal fisc in the form of indirect taxes only, enabling the States to pay appropriate contribution in lieu of taxes such as corporation tax. The unevenness of financial burden was inevitable in a set-up in which some of the federating units retained control over federal subjects such as armed forces and railways, etc.

53. In the judicial field also the jurisdiction of the Federal Court over the States was extremely limited. Internal constitution of the States was no concern of the framers of the Scheme of 1935. The fundamental rights which are the foundation of a democratic, State, found no place in