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Summarizing the above, a comprehensive definition describes a conspiracy theory as

We have seen how some important ontological and causal properties of conspiracy theories can be inferred from their key properties. We have provided some examples of how some of the most well-known and important findings in the conspiracy theory literature could be explained with recourse to the essential ontological features of these beliefs. However, though promising, this is essentially retrodictive. In the final sections, we turn to the more generative and predictive potential of this approach, outlining how it can contribute to theoretical progress over the coming years.

The first advantage of the definition of conspiracy beliefs given above is that it can generate new and important hypotheses about what makes conspiracy theories functionally different from other types of belief. This can then motivate research in which conspiracy beliefs are systematically compared and contrasted to other types of belief that lack the same essential characteristics (e.g., in experimental research) or are examined as predictors or dependent measures when those other beliefs are controlled for (e.g., in correlational research). Thus, the defining characteristics of conspiracy theories can be treated as categorical independent variables, allowing conspiracy theories to be differentiated empirically from similar kinds of belief that lack those defining characteristics. For example, conspiracy theories can be compared to similar beliefs in which agents did not bring about events secretly and intentionally but rather openly and negligently. Further, conspiracy theories can be compared to similar beliefs that allege a conspiracy took place but where the conspiracy does not pass a threshold of public interest.

The malevolence of alleged conspiracies is one essential feature that can be identified and manipulated (or measured) as a causal factor. Thus, as has been suggested by previous research, we might expect conspiracy theories to be attractive to paranoid (Darwin et al. 2011) and misanthropic (Abalakina-Paap et al. 1999, Douglas & Sutton 2011) individuals who are inclined to believe in human malevolence. We can expect this appeal to be attenuated when the alleged conspiracies are benign. Thus, we can build testable theories from explicating the essential properties of conspiracy theories and characterizing them as causal properties. Regarding the consequences of conspiracy theories (versus other types of belief), we can predict that beliefs that do not accuse outgroups of malevolent plots are less likely than conspiracy theories to foment intergroup hostility (Jolley et al. 2019, Kofta et al. 2020). Turning to the social communication of conspiracy theories, we can predict that the malevolence of the plots they allege will affect the motivation to share them. Stories about nonconspiracies, or benign conspiracies, will not have the same appeal to communicators who want to justify or profit from intergroup hostility. www.annualreviews.org • Conspiracy Theories287