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Rh Edward and Philip were irritated by the prospective loss of revenue and put heavy pressure on the clergy to make them contribute in spite of the pope's order. This was to be expected; what was unexpected was that no one in England or France showed much enthusiasm for Boniface's position. There was no wave of indignation against the impious kings; instead, the clergy were accused of disloyalty and unwillingness to make sacrifices for the common welfare. The clergy themselves were so harassed by government officials and so worried by their unpopularity that they begged the pope to allow them to contribute to the taxes for defense. Left without any support, Boniface retreated, step by grudging step. In the end, he admitted that in an emergency kings could tax the clergy for defense without prior consultation with the pope. Since the kings could define both "emergency" and "defense," it was a substantial victory for them.

The fact that lay denunciations of the clergy proved more effective than papal denunciations of lay rulers should have warned Boniface that the climate was changing. The Church could no longer be sure of the basic loyalty of the people of Western Europe. Instead, loyalty was increasingly concentrated on secular governments. These governments had, on the whole, done a good job during the thirteenth century. They had maintained order and striven for justice; they had established patterns of obedience which were hard to break. The creation of strong central governments in both England and France had encouraged the emergence of the common interests which would eventually ripen into nationalism; already many men felt that the welfare of their kingdom was more important than the wishes of the pope. Short of heresy, these men would support their rulers in a struggle with the Church, and it was no longer as easy as it had been to convince them that disagreement with the Church in administrative or political disputes was the equivalent of heresy. In short, the Church was losing one of its most important political weapons—the ability to stir up revolt against a disobedient king.