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Rh when they travel with goods as when they travel without them.”). But he nevertheless insists that, because of the way in which the Washington statute taxes fuel, the statute does not interfere with the right to travel reserved by the Yakamas in the treaty. Post, at 3.

First, finds it significant that “[t]he tax is calculated per gallon of fuel; not, like a toll, per vehicle or distance traveled.” Ibid., see also ibid. (“The tax before us does not resemble a blockade or a toll”). But that argument fails on its own terms. A toll on highway travel is no less a toll when the toll varies based on the number of axels on a vehicle traveling the highway, or on the number of people traveling in the vehicle. We cannot, therefore, see why the number of gallons of fuel that the vehicle carries should make all the difference. Put another way, the fact that a tax on travel varies based on the features of that travel does not mean that the tax is not a tax on travel.

Second, argues that it “makes no sense,” for example, to hold that “a tax on certain luxury goods” that is assessed the first time the goods are possessed in Washington cannot apply to a Yakama member “who buys” a mink coat “over the state line in Portland and then drives back to the reservation,” but the tax can apply to a Yakama member who “buys a mink coat at an off-reservation store in Washington.” Post, at 4. The short, conclusive answer to this argument is that there is a treaty that forbids taxing Yakama travel on highways with goods (e. g., fuel, or even furs) for market; and there is no treaty that forbids taxing Yakama off-reservation purchases of goods. Indeed, if our precedents supported ’s rule, then our fishing rights cases would have turned on whether Washington also taxed fish purchased in the grocery store. Compare, e. g., Tulee, 315 U. S., at 682, n. 1 (holding that the fishing right reserved by the Yakamas in the treaty pre-empted the application