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 put social media users on notice of what kinds of speech or content is now the target of government regulation.

Accordingly, because the Hateful Conduct Law appears to “reach[…] a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct”, Farrell, 449 F.3d at 496 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 n.8 (1983)), the Court finds that Plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success on their facial challenges under the First Amendment.
 * C.

Lastly, Plaintiffs allege that the Hateful Conduct Law is preempted by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act because it imposes liability on websites by treating them as publishers. (Pl.’s Mem., ECF No. 9 at 20–⁠21.)

The Communications Decency Act provides that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); see also ''Ricci v. Teamsters Union Loc. 456'', 781 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 2015). The Act has an express preemption provision which states that “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3).