Page:Vol 6 History of Mexico by H H Bancroft.djvu/315

Rh example of the emperor and their generals, who rushed into the thickest bullet showers to cheer them. Several hundred were slain and captured, including marauding citizens, and a large part of the store trains was retaken. Escobedo's report announced 300 killed and over 100 captured. Estrella de Occid., May 31, 1967. Salm-Salm says that 230 were killed on the way to Casa Blanca alone. He gives the result of the first success at 547 prisoners, 7 colors, and 15 guns, together with 6 guns brought in by Castillo, who had taken a first intrenchment in his direction, but failed at the following. The ammunition proved acceptable, and the provisions, including cattle, lasted for a few days. Arias admits a loss of over 20 guns. The report ran that the republicans lost 10,000 by desertion, and that some of their generals favored raising the siege. Basch, Erin., ii. 109-13, writes as if the movement had been intended merely to call attention from the north side of the town, where it was proposed to break through, and he alludes to a planned attack against the San Gregorio hill for the preceding day, which failed to be carried out, through some misunderstanding. Salm-Salm also declares that everything stood packed and prepared for departure, but by what direction is not stated, although he says that after the victory at El Cimatario 'nothing prevented 119 from leaving the city.' But the success changed all plans, Miramon evidently persuading Maximilian to remain and 'annihilate the rest of the enemy's forces;' yet he confesses that the exact plans for that day were unknown, save to Miramon, and perhaps Castillo. He calls Miramon the bad spirit of Maximilian, though willing to believe him blinded by illusions rather than guilty of deception. Diary, i. 154-68. Maguña says in Quer., Caida, 86-7, that false messages purporting to be from Marquez caused the loss of time. Peza and Pradillo, Max., 64, 78, doubt the project of breaking through, while misinterpreting it as intended to save only a part of the army. Arellano, Ultimas Horas, 123, assumes that it was intended to beat the besiegers in detail. The packing-up, which at first created unpleasant suspicions in Hans, Quer., 136-50, and others, is indicated by later accounts, by Salm-Salm and others, to have been merely a precaution in case of a disaster during these preliminary operations.

This turning of victory into defeat was undoubtedly due to a lack of promptness on the part of Miramon, to a neglect to follow up his advantage. The besieged appear to have been animated by a report that the attack was in cooperation with Marquez arrival in the rear. Now came the double disappointment, and dejection settled upon all, as manifested also among the soldiers during the subsequent unproductive attacks against Garita de Mexico and San Gregorio.

The misery was becoming too apparent in every direction to be covered any longer with false hope. Desertion and bullets had reduced the garrison to