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288 In order to distract the attention of the besiegers, Miramon, on the 22d of March, led an expedition down the valley, which captured a quantity of provisions. This enabled Marquez to depart unobserved during the night, across the hills to the south, with 1,200 horsemen, and attended by the new prime minister, Vidaurri. The well-instructed Castillo took Marquez' place at Querétaro and Miramon, now acknowledged as the leading general, rapidly gained favor and influence with the emperor.

With the additional inroads of desertion and bullets,Diary, i. 91. But this open promise is doubtful. Salm-Salm was not at the council. Peza and Pradillo assert, however, that at parting Maximilian in presence of several witnesses said: '; General; no olvide vd. que el Imperio se encuentra hoy en Querétaro!' — 'Descuide V. M.; antes de quince dias estaré de vuelta,' was the answer. Max., 110. The united declaration of the leading generals at a later council twice alludes to a relieving army from Mexico, which might be abandoned, Marquez' chief mission being to return to Querétaro with all the troops possible, Maximilian having confided to Marquez the glorious mission de venir á auxiliar,' for which sufficed '15 6 20 dias para llegar.' Arias, 217, 220. This seems most conclusive testimony, confirmed also by Lago, to whom among others Maximilian related his instructions to Marquez. ''Domenech, Hist. Mex''., iii. 437. Arellano, the bitter enemy of the general, weakens it, however, by intimating that the plans of Marquez were to be kept a secret even from the other generals, and that no combination was arranged for operating against the besiegers. Ultimas Horas, 97. Marquez naturally takes advantage of this to state that as none knew his instructions, he cannot be accused. It might also be supposed that Maximilian's revelations to Basch and others were intended for effect to inspire confidence. Nevertheless there can be no doubt that whatever Marquez had to do, he certainly had to send or bring reënforcements of men as well as funds and material. This becomes evident from the subsequent attempt to send after Marquez and arrest him, and from the very fact that the already meagre garrison was despoiled of its best troops to aid Marquez in the plan for relief — a plan which could not have meant operations in the southern districts where Diaz was. Maximilian's projects for a congress, in the centre of the country, and his orders for bringing archives and valuables from Mexico to Querétaro, show that the latter was now regarded as the key-point. Marquez' evident fabrications should therefore have been made to prove that he was unable to bring or send the required troops, etc. As for his motives, the desire for bitter vengeance — for what is not explained — attributed by Arellano, resolves itself rather into strategic efforts, with blunders and overweening ambition to retain the autocratic position of locum tenens, etc.