Page:Vol 5 History of Mexico by H H Bancroft.djvu/503

Rh enemy exhaust themselves by butting against the outworks of the capital. Although the strongest points had been turned, accident assisted him in drawing them toward his best remaining strongholds; and Scott, adhering evidently to the long-exploded tactics of never leaving a fort in the rear, allowed himself to be carried away. He should have called to mind Napoleon's maxim to avoid doing what the enemy desired. The victory of Padierna had opened the way toward Tacubaya and to several intermediate roads, unprotected by outworks, and with weak inner defences. Scott was sufficiently well informed of this to venture in all confidence to avoid the isolated outworks of Churubusco, so far from the capital, especially as he did not need or intend to use the road which it protected. The acquisition of Churubusco was valueless, and the expenditure of time and blood upon it a waste. It must be conceded, however, that the details of the attack, left mainly to the judgment of subordinate generals, were well outlined and managed, with slight exceptions.

The task of engaging and carrying the convent was assigned to Twiggs' division. Worth was left to pursue his advance along the southern road, leading to the river line defended by the main army, and portions of Pillow's and Quitman's divisions were sent to coöperate by a movement against Santa Anna's rear. Twiggs directed the brigades of Smith and Riley to occupy the ground in front and to the left of the convent respectively, assisted by a field-battery. The position could have been improved, for it left them exposed to a galling fire that opened wide gaps in the ranks and obliged the battery to retire after a while with heavy loss; yet the infantry maintained its ground well, even within seventy yards of the convent, sheltered to some extent from the incessant fusillade by obstructions which proved of no avail,