Page:Vol 1 History of Mexico by H H Bancroft.djvu/768

648 Cortés' own officers, however, could not fail to observe that Alvarado's course might have been followed with some advantage. They began to tire of the slow progress, attended as it was with so much fighting for so little gain; so much exposure to alternate rain and heat; so much discomfort in rude camps with poor diet and want of proper care for wounded or sick men. This was represented to Cortés, with the request that a general storming be attempted with a view to abbreviate the siege. He represented the danger of advancing over so many channels, along streets lined with houses, against hosts of determined warriors, with the prospect of being caught in the rear. Still he was as eager as any one to end the siege, and would call a council to deliberate on the matter. The result was a decided majority for the proposition to attempt the capture of Tlatelulco market and there establish a permanent camp.

Since Sandoval will not be able to render efficient service on his route for an attack on Tlatelulco, he is ordered to join Alvarado with the weightiest part of his forces, and to take advantage of the movement to entrap the Mexicans. He will pretend to make a general evacuation of his camp, and thus allure the foe to an attack on the baggage-train, during which the ambuscaded cavalry can inflict a lesson which shall also serve to secure the camp against later attack. Sandoval sends another portion of his forces to Cortés, who has more points to cover, and receives instructions to attend in particular to the capture of the channels and their filling, and otherwise to secure the safety of the more impetuous Alvarado.

On the day appointed, the brigantines with their flotillas are sent early to aid in clearing the causeways and approaches. The troops find little trouble in