Page:Vol 1 History of Mexico by H H Bancroft.djvu/511

Rh advised of his approach by the Indians, Narvaez had taken alarm, and was forming the best part of his troops in the field between him and Cempoala. To this he had been prompted also by the more watchful of his captains, who had not failed to observe the growing sympathy for the rival general. This most unpleasant change of tactics disconcerted Cortés not a little, and for the time he could do nothing but remain in camp, protected in front by the creek. Fortune again came to the rescue, however, in the form of a heavy rain, which fell all Sunday. It was the beginning of the rainy season. Most of Narvaez' men, unused to military service, and enervated by the frivolous inactivity of the camp, found this highly disagreeable, and began to complain at what they termed an unnecessary precaution against an insignificant foe. The friends of Cortés did not fail to take advantage of this feeling by ridiculing the manœuvre, representing that no troops, much less a handful of boasters, would think of attacking in such weather. They would in any case be far more secure within their strong quarters, and by leaving an advance post in the field timely warning could be given. This appeared to be reasonable, and since Narvaez by no means relished the exposure, he gave orders to return to quarters before dusk, leaving, however, a body of forty horsemen on the plain and two spies at a brook ford, about half a league off. The remainder of the horses were kept saddled at the entrance to the camp, and the men were instructed to sleep on their arms, prepared at any rate to reoccupy the field in the morning. The watchword was 'Santa María.'

Cortés was occupied in devising new measures when