Page:Victory at Sea - William Sowden Sims and Burton J. Hendrick.djvu/356

338 and to strengthen Allied lines, both offensively and defensively, wherever necessary.

Such a course might be considered as a disintegration of our fleet, and it is only natural, therefore, that hesitation and caution should be felt in its adoption.

4. I have felt, however, that it was possible to accomplish our mission without in any way involving the so-called dis- integration of our fleet as a whole.

In the first instance I have assumed that our aim would be to project, or prepare to project, our maximum force against the enemy offensively.

5. An estimate of the situation shows clearly that the enemy is depending for success upon breaking down the Allies' lines of communications by virtue of the submarine campaign.

A necessary part of such a plan" is to divert strength from the main fleet and from anti-submarine operations by such means as coastal raids, threats of landing operations, air raids, and attacks on hospital ships, which last necessitates destroyer escort for such vessels.

The submarine campaign itself, while it is of necessity con- centrated primarily on the most vital lines of communications, is nevertheless carried out in such a manner as to lead the Allies to disperse, and not concentrate, their inadequate anti- submarine Forces.

The Allies are, of course, forced to contemplate at all times, and hence provide against, the possibility of another main fleet action.

6. A study of the submarine situation, the number of sub- marines available to the enemy, and the necessary lines of the Allies' communications, for both Army and Navy as well as civil needs, shows clearly that the enemy must direct his main effort in certain restricted areas.

These areas, as has repeatedly been reported, are included approximately in a circle drawn from about Ushant to the north of Scotland. The most effective field for enemy activity is, of course, close into the Irish Sea and Channel approaches, where all lines must focus.

But, as stated above, the enemy also attacks occasionally -well out to sea and in other dispersed areas with a view of scattering the limited anti-submarine forces available. It therefore seems manifest that the war not only is, but must remain, in European waters, in so far as success or failure is concerned.

7. Speaking generally, but disregarding for the moment the question of logistics, our course of action, in order to throw our main strength against the enemy, would be to move all our forces, including the battleship fleet, into the war area.