Page:Veronica Ollier v. Sweetwater Union High School District (September 19, 2014) US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.djvu/33

 speculates, it would have found Castle Park in compliance with Title IX and would not have issued an injunction. This argument fails for several reasons. First, a “trial court’s power to control the conduct of trial is broad.” United States v. Panza, 612 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1979). Establishing a cutoff date after which it would not consider supplemental improvements to facilities at Castle Park—especially one that was only 90 days before trial—aided orderly pre-trial procedure and was well within the district court’s discretion.

Second, the district court did consider some of Sweetwater’s remedial improvements, “particularly with respect to the girls’ softball facility,” but concluded that “those steps have not been consistent, adequate or comprehensive” and that “many violations of Title IX have not been remedied or even addressed.” Sweetwater’s contention that “the District Court appeared to ignore key evidence of changed facilities” is unpersuasive.

Third, even if contemporaneous evidence showed that Sweetwater was complying with Title IX at the time of trial, the district court still could have issued an injunction based on past harm. ''See United States v. Mass. Mar. Acad.'', 762 F.2d 142, 157–58 (1st Cir. 1985). The plaintiff class included future students, who were protected by the injunction. “Voluntary cessation” of wrongful conduct “does not moot a case or controversy unless subsequent events ma[ke] it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” ''Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1'', 551 U.S. 701, 719 (2007) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).