Page:Urantia Foundation v. Maaherra (D. Ariz. 1995).pdf/5



The ultimate issue before me is whether the plaintiff’s copyright and trademarks are valid. The defendant argues that the court should abstain from deciding the issue because the dispute over this matter is an ecclesiastical one. I am confident, however, that the issue can be decided through the interpretation of statutes, not scriptures. "[T]he First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving church property disputes. It is obvious, however, that not every civil court decision as to property claimed by a religious organization jeopardizes values protected by the First Amendment. Civil courts do not inhibit free exercise of religion merely by opening their doors to disputes involving church property. And there are neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes, which can be applied without ‘establishing’ churches to which property is awarded. … [T]he Amendment therefore commands civil courts to decide church property disputes without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine."

Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449, 89 S.Ct. 601, 606, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969) (citation omitted); see Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976). I am convinced that neutral principles of law are applicable to the instant case and may be relied upon to determine whether the plaintiff’s copyright and trademarks are valid.

The defendant’s desire is to propagate the message of The URANTIAUrantia [sic] Book, and neither the Urantia Foundation nor this court can constitutionally prohibit that endeavor. The defendant, however, has chosen as one means of accomplishing this task the verbatim copying of the entire text of The URANTIAUrantia [sic] Book coupled with the free distribution of that copied text to all who are interested. In addition, the defendant has used the plaintiff’s registered trademarks on various materials sent along with the distributed text. The defendant attempts to justify her means by pointing to the First Amendment’s Free Exercise of Religion Clause.

The Free Exercise Clause absolutely prohibits any governmental attempt to regulate religious beliefs per se. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). "Government may neither compel affirmation of a repugnant belief; nor penalize or discriminate against individuals or groups because they hold religious views abhorrent to the authorities; nor employ the taxing power to inhibit the dissemination of particular religious views."

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1793, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (citations omitted). The freedom to act, however, even when such action is based upon one’s religious convictions, remains tethered to certain legislative restrictions. As the United States Supreme Court declared over fifty years ago: "The religious liberty which the Constitution protects has never excluded legislation of general scope not directed against doctrinal loyalties of particular sects. … Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs. The mere possession of religious convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities."

Minersville Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594–95, 60 S.Ct. 1010, 1013, 84 L.Ed. 1375 (1940) (footnote omitted).

The copyright and trademark laws are such neutral laws of general applicability to which the defendant must adhere for the betterment of the public good, regardless of her religious convictions to the contrary. Nevertheless, she “admits copying the text of The Urantia Book … and admits distributing [it] … throughout the United States.” (Def.’s Answer at 3, ¶13.) Furthermore, the defendant “admits to use of the concentric