Page:Urantia Foundation v. Maaherra (D. Ariz. 1995).pdf/24

 and all facts stated in the certificates.” (Pl.’s Br. at 3 n. 1.) The plaintiff claims such action would be proper because “17 U.S.C. § 410(c) … provides that the weight given to any certificate issued more than 5 years after publication of the work is left to the Court’s discretion.” (Pl.’s Br. at 2 n.1.) I decline the plaintiff’s invitation. See Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213, 1214–15 n. 3 (2d Cir.) (explaining Register of Copyrights typically allows conflicting claimants to register for renewal without determining validity of claim), ''cert. denied'', 409 U.S. 997, 93 S.Ct. 320, 34 L.Ed.2d 262 (1972); Epoch Producing Corp. v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 522 F.2d 737, 746 (2d Cir.1975) (holding no presumption of validity attaches to certificate of renewal), ''cert. denied'', 424 U.S. 955, 96 S.Ct. 1429, 47 L.Ed.2d 360 (1976); Nimmer § 9.05[D][2], at 9-88 (“explaining span of time between initial publication and copyright renewal should generally preclude renewal certificate from constituting prima facie evidence”).

Therefore, I decline both of the plaintiff’s entreaties. I will not adhere to the old adage that “possession is nine-tenths of the law,” nor will I submit to the minority view that a certificate of copyright renewal is prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Instead, I will evaluate each piece of evidence according to its independent worth.

The plaintiff renewed its copyright in The URANTIAUrantia [sic] Book in 1983, by which time the Copyright Act of 1976 had become effective. However, the renewal section under which the book falls, Section 304, is identical to that of Section 24 of the Copyright Act of 1909. Furthermore, as the plaintiff correctly states, “[t]he passage of the [1976 Act] did not alter the definition of a ‘work for hire’ for the purpose of renewing a copyright originally registered under the [1909 Act]. … Thus, whether The URANTIA Book is a ‘commissioned work’ must be decided under the Copyright Act of 1909.” (Pl.’s Br. at 5 n. 4.) See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 217, 110 S.Ct. 1750, 1758, 109 L.Ed.2d 184 (1990) (holding renewal rights in pre-1978 works require Court to “look to the language of and case law interpreting § 24”); Forward v. Thorogood, 985 F.2d 604, 606 n. 2 (1st Cir.1993) (explaining 1976 Act’s provisions on works for hire operate prospectively).

The 1909 Act provides statutory copyright protection to “all the writings of an author.” 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1976). The Act also extends copyright protection to the “proprietor of any work made the subject of copyright by this title.” Id. § 9. Although the Act never defines the term “proprietor,” it does define the word “author” to “include an employer in the case of works made for hire.” Id. § 26. “The statute represents a codification of the so-called ‘works for hire’ doctrine recognized by the Supreme Court in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 23 S.Ct. 298, 47 L.Ed. 460 (1903).” Murray v. Gelderman, 566 F.2d 1307, 1309 (5th Cir.1978). Therefore, one claiming the initial term of copyright must either be “the author of the copyrightable work (i.e., either the individual creator or the employer in the case of works made for hire … or he must have succeeded to the rights of the author through an assignment or other device.”)). [sic] Epoch, 522 F.2d at 743 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

The right to renew a copyright under the 1909 Act is determined exclusively by Section 24. Although the renewal has been described as not simply an extension of the initial term of copyright, id., but rather the creation of “a new estate”, separate and distinct from the original copyright, the section does utilize the same aforementioned terms and principles. Section 24 states in pertinent part: