Page:Urantia Foundation v. Maaherra.pdf/7

 be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright in such work for the further term of 47 years…. And provided further, that in the case of any other copyrighted work, including a contribution by an individual author to a periodical or to a cyclopedic or other composite work, the author of such work, if still living, or the widow, widower, or children of the author, if the author be not living, or if such author, widow, widower, or children be not living, then the author’s executors, or in the absence of a will, his or her next of kin shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright in such work for a further term of 47 years…. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1983).

As to whether the Book was a “work made for hire,” Maaherra is probably correct that it was not. The Foundation was never the employer of any of the spiritual beings, of Dr. Sadler, of the Contact Commission, or of any other entity that played a role in the creation of the Papers that were eventually transferred to the Foundation. An employment (or commissioning) relationship at the time the work is created is a condition for claiming renewal as the proprietor of a “work made for hire”..” [sic] See 17 U.S.C. § 101; Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 23 S.Ct. 298, 47 L.Ed. 460 (1903); Lin-Brook Builders Hardware v. Gertler, 352 F.2d 298 (9th Cir.1965); Rohauer v. Friedman, 306 F.2d 933 (9th Cir.1962).

Before the district court and on appeal, the Foundation has contended that it would have been entitled to claim renewal as the “proprietor of a composite work.” The district court rejected this contention. Urantia, 895 F.Supp. at 1354. The problem, in the district court’s view, was not whether the structure of the Book satisfied the definition of a “composite work;” the district court assumed that it did. Rather, the district court held that the Foundation had failed to establish “proprietorship” at the time the original copyright was secured because it had failed to show a “contractual arrangement entitling [it] to secure copyright in the various contributions.” Urantia, 895 F.Supp. at 1354 (citing Cadence Industries Corp. v. Ringer, 450 F.Supp. 59, 64 (S.D.N.Y.1978)). On this point, we have held the court erred. The language of the trust instrument was, moreover, very broad, and sufficient to transfer not only the interest in the original copyright term, but in the renewal as well. See Burton, supra, at 219.

Maaherra on appeal also contends that even if the Foundation would have been entitled to secure the Book’s renewal rights as the “proprietor of a composite work,” the inaccuracy in the description of the claim in the Foundation’s application for renewal destroyed the validity of its renewal copyright. This issue the district court did not decide.

Timeliness was the only clear statutory requirement for copyright renewal of a work whose original statutory copyright was secured prior to January 1, 1964. The renewal statute in effect at the time the Foundation renewed its copyright in the Book required the claimant to apply for and register its renewal claim within the last year of the original copyright term. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1983) (providing that copyright was properly renewed “where application for … renewal … shall have been made to the Copyright Office and duly registered therein within one year prior to the expiration of the original term of copyright” and that “in default of the registration of such application for renewal … the copyright in any work shall terminate at the expiration of twenty-eight years from the date copyright was originally secured[ ]”). Thus, the Foundation had to renew the Book’s copyright by December 31, 1983, when the original copyright term was to expire. See 17 U.S.C. § 305 (copyright terms “run to the end of the calendar year in which they would otherwise expire[ ]”). The Foundation timely applied for renewal in January of 1983.

Maaherra contends, however, that timeliness is not enough. Focusing on the language of the first proviso of Section