Page:United States v. Texas (2023).pdf/61

Rh the relief requested would redress appellant’s claimed injury.” Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 79, n. 24 (1978); see (opinion concurring in judgment).

The Court notes in a quick parenthetical that the “Linda R. S. principle” was once “cit[ed] … in [the] immigration context” in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U. S. 883, 897 (1984),. But Sure-Tan’s single “[c]f.” cite to Linda R. S. provides the Court no help. 467 U. S., at 897. Sure-Tan only rejected (quite reasonably) any standalone “cognizable interest in procuring enforcement of the immigration laws” by a party who lacked any “personal interest.” Ibid. (emphasis added). And it did so, not as part of a standing analysis, but as part of its explanation for rejecting two employers’ attempt to assert that seeking to have employees deported as retaliation for union activity was “an aspect of their First Amendment right ‘to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.’ ” Id., at 896.

After these two inapposite precedents, the majority’s authority gets even weaker. I agree with that neither Heckler, nor Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U. S. 748 (2005), has real relevance here. Castle Rock considered the “deep-rooted nature of law-enforcement discretion” as a tool for interpreting a statute, not as a constitutional standing rule. 545 U. S., at 761. And as explained above, Heckler is not about standing and only states a presumptive rule. The Court’s remaining authorities are likewise consistent with the understanding that prosecution decisions are “generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion” unless the relevant law rebuts the “presumption.” Heckler, 470 U. S., at 831 (emphasis added). For example, TransUnion states that it is only when “unharmed plaintiffs” are before the Court that Article III forecloses interference with the “discretion of the Executive Branch.” 594 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 13) (emphasis deleted).