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16, 249 U. S. 479, 486–487 (1919); The Assigned Car Cases, 274 U. S. 564, 584 (1927). In a third case, the plaintiff sought “to enjoin enforcement of” an order of the Federal Communications Commission. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, 316 U. S. 407, 408 (1942). That is a claim for traditional equitable relief, and indeed, the Court held that the complaint “state[d] a cause of action in equity” and remanded for further proceedings. Id., at 425. A fourth case, involving an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, seems of a piece. There, a district court held the Commission’s order invalid and “restrain[ed] … enforcement” of it. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 5 F. Supp. 929, 936 (ND Ohio 1933). This Court affirmed. See United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 293 U. S. 454 (1935). True, this Court described the case as an “appeal from [a] decree … setting aside” the Commission’s order. Id., at 455. But the fact that the lower court had only restrained enforcement of the order goes to show that “set aside” did not then (and does not now) necessarily translate to “vacate.”

At the end of the day, the States fall back on other lower court decisions. “For more than 30 years,” they say, “vacatur has been the ordinary result when the D. C. Circuit determines that agency regulations are unlawful.” Brief for Respondents 42 (internal quotation marks omitted). Doubtless, to the extent those decisions are carefully reasoned, they merit respectful consideration. But, equally, they do not bind us. Cf. (, dissenting) (observing that this Court has only ever “assumed” that the APA authorizes vacatur).

In raising questions about the district court’s claim that §706(2) authorizes vacatur of agency action, I do not pretend that the matter is open and shut. Thoughtful arguments and scholarship exist on both sides of the debate. Nor do I mean to equate vacatur of agency action with universal injunctions. Despite some similarities, courts can at