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8 Beyond these redressability problems may lie still another. Recall the essential premise on which the district court proceeded—that the APA empowers courts to vacate agency action. The federal government vigorously disputes this premise, arguing that the law does not contemplate this form of relief. The reasons the government offers are plenty and serious enough to warrant careful consideration.

Traditionally, when a federal court finds a remedy merited, it provides party-specific relief, directing the defendant to take or not take some action relative to the plaintiff. If the court’s remedial order affects nonparties, it does so only incidentally. See, e.g., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U. S. 922, 931 (1975) (“[N]either declaratory nor injunctive relief can directly interfere with the enforcement of contested statutes or ordinances except with respect to the particular federal plaintiffs.”); ''Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F. 2d 832 (CA2 1930) (L. Hand, J.) (“[A] court of equity … cannot lawfully enjoin the world at large.”); see also Trump v. Hawaii'', 585 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (, concurring) (slip op., at 6). This tracks the founding-era understanding that courts “render a judgment or decree upon the rights of the litigant[s].” Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 718 (1838). It also ensures that federal courts respect the limits of their Article III authority to decide cases and controversies and avoid trenching on the power of the elected branches to shape legal rights and duties more broadly. After all, the “judicial Power” is the power to “decide cases for parties, not questions for everyone.” S. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 421 (2017).

Despite these foundational principles, in recent years a number of lower courts have asserted the authority to issue