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Rh concrete injur[y] under Article III.” TransUnion, 594 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9); see also Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 592 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 11). Indeed, this Court has allowed other States to challenge other Executive Branch policies that indirectly caused them monetary harms. See, e.g., Department of Commerce v. New York, 588 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2019) (slip op., at 9–10). So why are these States now forbidden from doing the same?

Next, the Court contends that, “when the Executive Branch elects not to arrest or prosecute, it does not exercise coercive power over an individual’s liberty or property.” Here again, in principle, I agree. But if an exercise of coercive power matters so much to the Article III standing inquiry, how to explain decisions like Massachusetts v. EPA? There the Court held that Massachusetts had standing to challenge the federal government’s decision not to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles. See 549 U. S., at 516–526. And what could be less coercive than a decision not to regulate? In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court chose to overlook this difficulty in part because it thought the State’s claim of standing deserved “special solicitude.” Id., at 520. I have doubts about that move. Before Massachusetts v. EPA, the notion that States enjoy relaxed standing rules “ha[d] no basis in our jurisprudence.” Id., at 536 (, dissenting). Nor has “special solicitude” played a meaningful role in this Court’s decisions in the years since. Even so, it’s hard not to wonder why the Court says nothing about “special solicitude” in this case. And it’s hard not to think, too, that lower courts should just leave that idea on the shelf in future ones.

Finally, the Court points to the fact that Article II vests in the President considerable enforcement discretion. So much so that “courts generally lack meaningful standards for assessing the propriety of [the Executive Branch’s] enforcement choices.” But almost as