Page:United States v. Samperyac.pdf/36

Rh  Rh  , in good faith, some time in November or December, 1828. But this gave him no right to be let in as a party in the bill of review; he was not a party to the original bill, nor could he connect himself with Samperyac, the only party to the bill, he being a fictitious person; and the interest of Stewart, whatever it might be, was acquired long after the original decree was entered. He was, therefore, a perfect stranger to that decree. The deed purporting to have been given by Samperyac to Bowie, is admitted to be a forgery. Bowie, of course, had no interest, legal or equitable, which he could convey to Stewart. But, admitting Stewart to have been properly let in, as a party in the bill of review, the only colorable equity which he showed was the certificate of entry given by the register of the land office, December 13, 1828; and this certificate, founded on a decree in favor of Samperyac, a fictitious person, obtained by fraud, and upon forged evidence of title.

This certificate is entirely unavailable to Stewart. He can obtain no patent under it if the original decree should remain unreversed; for the act of 1830 forbids any patent thereafter to be issued, except in the name of the original party to the de cree, and on proof to the satisfaction of the officers, that the party applying is such original party, or is duly authorized by such original party, or his heirs, to receive such patent.

The original party to the decree being a fictitious person, no title would pass under the patent, if issued. It would still remain in the United States. But Stewart acquired no right whatever under the deed from Bowie; the latter having no interest that he could convey. In the case of Polk's Lessee v. Wendall, 5 Wheat. 308, it is said by this court, that on general principles, it is incontestable that a grantee can convey no more than he possesses. Hence, those who come in under the holder of a void grant can acquire nothing.

Upon the whole, we think Stewart was improperly admitted to become a party; but considering him a proper party, he has shown no ground upon which he can sustain a right to the land in question.

The decree of the court below is accordingly affirmed, with costs.