Page:United States v. Morton (19-10842) (2021) Opinion.pdf/12

 the phone.”). And a Tenth Circuit decision similarly addresses the issues here: after arresting a defendant for drug crimes, officers applied for and received a warrant to search his computers for files containing “names, telephone numbers, ledger receipts, addresses, and other documentary evidence” of drug offenses. United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir. 1999). No drug-related evidence was found, but the officer undertaking the search also viewed the defendant’s photographs and found child pornography. Id. at 1271. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that these photographs should be suppressed. Id. at 1276.

In rejecting the government’s argument that the situation was similar to “an officer having a warrant to search a file cabinet containing many drawers,” the panel held that this was “not a case in which the officers had to open each file drawer before discovering its contents.” Id. at 1274–75. Instead, the government “opened a drawer” marked “photographs” for which they did not have probable cause. Id. Subsequent Tenth Circuit cases have upheld the approach that Carey established, proscribing those searches with no “limiting principle” while sanctioning those that “affirmatively limit the search to evidence of … specific types of material” in the digital setting. United States v. Russian, 848 F.3d 1239, 1245 (10th Cir. 2017); United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 862 (10th Cir. 2005). Other circuits have reached similar results. United States v. Rosa, 626 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 2010) (concluding that a warrant to search a digital device “failed to describe with particularity the evidence sought and, more specifically, to link that evidence to the criminal activity supported by probable cause,” resulting in an impermissible “general warrant”); United States v. Pitts, 173 F.3d 677 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting in an analogous context outside the realm of digital searches that “when a warrant lists several locations to be searched, a court can suppress evidence recovered at a location in the warrant for which police lacked probable cause but admit evidence recovered at locations for which probable cause was established”). Having demonstrated that the warrants to search the photographs stored on Morton’s cellphones were not supported by probable cause, we next turn to the question of whether the evidence produced by the search may nevertheless be admitted based upon the good faith exception. To resolve this question, we ask whether the officers’ good faith reliance on these defective warrants was objectively reasonable. The district court’s decision on the objective reasonableness of an officer’s reliance is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. United States v. Jarman, 847 F.3d 259, 264