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18 since Congress enacted clause (iv)’s immediate predecessor. Instead, he offers a string of hypotheticals, all premised on the expansive ordinary meanings of “encourage” and “induce.” In his view, clause (iv) would punish the author of an op-ed criticizing the immigration system, “[a] minister who welcomes undocumented people into the congregation and expresses the community’s love and support,” and a government official who instructs “undocumented members of the community to shelter in place during a natural disaster.” Brief for Respondent 16–19. Yet none of Hansen’s examples are filtered through the elements of solicitation or facilitation—most importantly, the requirement (which we again repeat) that a defendant intend to bring about a specific result. See, e.g., Rosemond, 572 U. S., at 76. Clause (iv) does not have the scope Hansen claims, so it does not produce the horribles he parades.

To the extent that clause (iv) reaches any speech, it stretches no further than speech integral to unlawful conduct. “[I]t has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.” Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490, 502 (1949). Speech intended to bring about a particular unlawful act has no social value; therefore, it is unprotected. Williams, 553 U. S., at 298. We have applied this principle many times, including to the promotion