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10 cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word.” Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 263 (1952); see also, e.g., United States v. Shabani, 513 U. S. 10, 13–14 (1994).

To see how this works, consider the word “attempts,” which appears in clause (iv)’s next-door neighbors. See §§§ [sic]1324(a)(1)(A)(i)–(iii). In a criminal prohibition, we would not understand “attempt” in its ordinary sense of “try.” Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 133 (2d ed. 2001). We would instead understand it to mean taking “a substantial step” toward the completion of a crime with the requisite mens rea. United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U. S. 102, 107 (2007). “Encourages or induces” likewise carries a specialized meaning. After all, when a criminal-law term is used in a criminal-law statute, that—in and of itself—is a good clue that it takes its criminal-law meaning. And the inference is even stronger here, because clause (iv) prohibits “encouraging” and “inducing” a violation of law. See §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). That is the focus of criminal solicitation and facilitation too.

In concluding otherwise, the Ninth Circuit stacked the deck in favor of ordinary meaning. See 25 F. 4th, at 1109–1110; see also United States v. Hernandez-Calvillo, 39 F. 4th 1297, 1304 (CA10 2022) (“Our construction of [the verbs in clause (iv)] begins with their ordinary meaning, not their specialized meaning in criminal law”). But it should have given specialized meaning a fair shake. When words have several plausible definitions, context differentiates among them. That is just as true when the choice is between ordinary and specialized meanings, see, e.g., Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U. S. 188, 202 (1974) (“While a layman might well assume that time of day worked reflects one aspect of a job’s ‘working conditions,’ the term has a different and much more specific meaning in the language of industrial relations”), as it is when a court must choose among multiple ordinary meanings, see, e.g., Muscarello v.