Page:United States v. Hansen.pdf/13

Rh Hansen, like the Ninth Circuit, insists that clause (iv) uses “encourages” and “induces” in their ordinary rather than their specialized sense. While he offers definitions from multiple dictionaries, the terms are so familiar that two samples suffice. In ordinary parlance, “induce” means “[t]o lead on; to influence; to prevail on; to move by persuasion or influence.” Webster’s New International Dictionary 1269 (2d ed. 1953). And “encourage” means to “inspire with courage, spirit, or hope.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 747 (1966).

In Hansen’s view, clause (iv)’s use of the bare words “encourages” or “induces” conveys these ordinary meanings. See Brief for Respondent 14. “[T]hat encouragement can include aiding and abetting,” he says, “does not mean it is restricted to aiding and abetting.” Id., at 25. And because clause (iv) “proscribes encouragement, full stop,” id., at 14, it prohibits even an “op-ed or public speech criticizing the immigration system and supporting the rights of long-term undocumented noncitizens to remain, at least where the author or speaker knows that, or recklessly disregards whether, any of her readers or listeners are undocumented.” Id., at 17–18. If the statute reaches the many examples that Hansen posits, its applications to protected speech might swamp its lawful applications, rendering it vulnerable to an overbreadth challenge.

We hold that clause (iv) uses “encourages or induces” in its specialized, criminal-law sense—that is, as incorporating common-law liability for solicitation and facilitation. In truth, the clash between definitions is not much of a contest. “Encourage” and “induce” have well-established legal meanings—and when Congress “borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the