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 was sufficient for the jury to conclude that that incident was an act of bribery provides the context to conclude that Delgado used his phone to facilitate an unlawful activity.

In sum, all three of Delgado’s convictions under § 1952(a)(3) were supported by sufficient evidence.

Finally, Delgado challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction on Count Eight for obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2).

Under that section, it is a crime to “corruptly … obstruct[], influence[], or impede[] any official proceeding, or attempt[] to do so.” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2). “Though a proceeding need not be actually pending at the time of the obstructive act, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(f), an obstruction of justice conviction requires some ‘nexus’ between the obstructive act and some official government proceeding.” United States v. Simpson, 741 F.3d 539, 552 (5th Cir. 2014). And the “proceeding must at least be ‘foreseen,’ such that the defendant has in contemplation some particular official proceeding” that he intends his conduct would impede or obstruct. Id.; United States v. Bedoy, 827 F.3d 495, 507 (5th Cir. 2016). An “official proceeding” includes proceedings before a federal grand jury. 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(1)(A).

Moreover, a person acts “corruptly” under the statute when they act “knowingly and dishonestly, with specific intent to subvert or undermine the due administration of justice.” United States v. Coppin, 569 F. App’x 326, 334 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion); see also Bedoy, 827 F.3d at 510 (approving of Coppin’s definition). Such intent can be proven with “circumstantial evidence alone.” Bedoy, 827 F.3d at 509 (quoting United States v. Rojas, 812 F.3d 382, 400 (5th Cir. 2016)).