Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 98 Part 3.djvu/214

 98 STAT. 2586

26 UST 583.

PUBLIC LAW 98-525—OCT. 19, 1984

(2) the budget resources necessary to support verification requirements necessary to determine compliance with the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and a chemical weapons ban. (c) The President is requested to submit the report referred to in subsection (b) to the committees referred to in such subsection not later than December 31, 1984. SENSE OF CONGRESS EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR UNITED STATES TO PURSUE OUTSTANDING ARMS CONTROL COMPLIANCE

President of U.S.

President of U.S.

SEC. 1110. (a) The Congress makes the following findings: (I) It is a vital security objective of the United States to limit the Soviet nuclear threat against the United States and its allies. (2) The President has declared that "as for existing strategic arms agreements, we will refrain from actions which undercut them so long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint". (3) The United States has legitimate concerns about certain Soviet actions and behavior relevant to limitations and other provisions of existing strategic arms agreements. (4) The President has declared that "the United States will continue to press compliance issues with the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels, and to insist upon explanations, clarifications, and corrective actions". (5) The President has also declared that "the United States is continuing to carry out its obligations under relevant agreements". (6) It would be detrimental to the security interests of the United States and its allies and to international peace and stability for the last remaining limitations on strategic offensive nuclear weapons to break down or lapse before replacement by a new strategic arms control agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. (7) The continuation of existing restraints on strategic offensive nuclear arms would provide an atmosphere more conducive to achieving an agreement significantly reducing the levels of nuclear arms. (8) The Soviet Union has not agreed to a date for resumption of the nuclear arms talks in Geneva, and it is incumbent on the Soviet Union to return to the negotiating table. (9) A termination of existing restraints on strategic offensive nuclear weapons could make the resumption of negotiations more difficult. (10) Both sides have, to date, abided by important numerical and other limits contained in existing strategic offensive arms agreements, including dismantling operational missile-firing submarines and remaining within the ceilings on multiplewarhead missile launchers and other related limits. (II) It is in the interest of the United States and its allies for the Soviet Union to continue to dismantle older missile-firing submarines as new ones are deployed and to continue to remain at or below a level of 820 launchers of intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles, 1,200 launchers of intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles and submarine launched ballistic missiles, and 1,320 launchers of interconti-

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