Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 53 Part 1.djvu/704

 APPENDIX CXCIL effect in law as though it had been originally granted for 21 years," the extension had the same effect as though the patent had been originally granted for 21 years from 1852 and that he should be allowed to recover for the 2 years 1864 to 1866, as well as for the term 1866 to 1873. The provision of the act of July 8, 1870, containing the limitation was omitted from the Revised Statutes, and the act of 1870 was repealed by section 5596 of the Revised Statutes. Held, the statute of limi- tations as pleaded was a bar to recovery under the original term of the patent and recovery would be allowed only as to the extended term; that the original term and the extended term were two distinct terms. The act of 1870 was repealed by the Revised Statutes, except as to the statute of limitations con- tained therein as to causes of action arising thereunder. Section 5599 provided "All acts of limitation embraced in said revision and covered by said repeal shall not be affected thereby, but all * * * suits for causes arising, or acts done or committed, prior to said repeal may be commenced and prosecuted within the same time as if said repeal had not been made." Also, Hayden v. Oriental Mills, 22 Fed. 103, Circuit Court, District of Rhode Island, which was an action on a patent. The court said R. S . 5599 saved all rights the same as if suit had been commenced before the repeal of the federal statute of limitations of July 8, 1870. Also, May v. Buchanan County, Iowa, Circuit Court for the Northern District of Iowa, 29 Fed. 469, action on patent right and statute of 6 years under act of 1870 was pleaded. Court said that as to causes of action arising after June 22, 1874, the limitation was repealed by R. S . 5596; but R. S . 5599 continued the act of 1870 in force as to all causes of action then in existence. Demurrer as to the statute of limitations was overruled. SEC. 5600. The arrangement and classification of the several sec- tions of the revision have been made for the purpose of a more con- venient and orderly arrangement of the same, and therefore no inference or presumption of a legislative construction is to be drawn by reason of the Title, under which any particular section is placed. Doyle v. Wisconsin, 94 U. S. 50 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin issued a writ of mandamus to recall license issued to an insurance company. The writ was served and obeyed. Afterward a writ of error was sued out and bond given to operate as a supersedeas. The plaintiff in error contended that as a writ of error to operate as a supersedeas might issue from the Supreme Court to reexamine the judgment of the State court, a writ to carry the judgment into effect could not issue from the State court until the expiration of 10 days after the rendition of the judgment, under section 1007 of the Revised Statutes, as amended by act of February 18, 1875, which provided: "When a writ of error may be a supersedeas, execution shall not issue until the expiration of 10 days * * * "after rendition of judgment. The writ of error was issued under section 709 of the Revised Statutes, which is in chapter 11 of title XXXIII, relating to the Judiciary. The provision that a writ of error might operate as a supersedeas, is in section 1007 of the Revised Statutes, as amended, which is in chapter 18 of the Judiciary title. One of these sections was derived from section 23 of the Judiciary Act of 1879 and the other was derived from section 25 of the same act. The change in arrangement did not prevent the court from giving effect to their location in the original act. Hyde v. United States, 225 U. S. 347 Writ of certiorari to the D. C. Court of Appeals. Petitioners convicted in the Supreme Court for the District of Columbia of the crime of conspiracy under section 5440 of the Revised Statutes and the con- viction affirmed by the D. C. Court of Appeals. The conspiracy charged was that the petitioners conspired to obtain by fraudulent devices from the States of California and Oregon school lands lying in forest reserves, exchange them for lands of the United States open to selection, and then to sell the lands so obtained. Judgment affirmed by the Supreme Court. The main question involved was the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. The court held that overt acts performed in one district by one of the parties who had conspired in another district in violation of R. S. 5440 give jurisdiction to the court in the district where the overt acts are performed as to all the conspirators. In the course of the opinion the court said: "If the unlawful combination and the overt act constitute the offense, as stated in Hyde v. Shine, marking its beginning and its execution or a step to its execu- tion, section 731 of the Revised Statutes must be applied. That section provides that 'when any offense against the lUited States is begun in one judicial district

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